## K

#### The aff’s invocation of death impacts is necrophilia, an obsession with body counts that ends in extinction. Vote neg to reject death impacts—this is a gateway issue—if they win death impacts are good, the rest of the 1NC applies—we won’t cross-apply to prove links

Erich **Fromm 64**, PhD in sociology from Heidelberg in 1922, psychology prof at MSU in the 60’s, “Creators and Destroyers”, The Saturday Review, New York (04. January 1964), pp. 22-25

People are aware of the possibility of nuclear war; they are aware of the destruction such a war could bring with it--and yet they seemingly make no effort to avoid it. Most of us are puzzled by this behavior because we start out from the premise that people love life and fear death. Perhaps we should be less puzzled if we questioned this premise. Maybe there are many people who are indifferent to life and many others who do not love life but who do love death. There is an orientation which we may call love of life (biophilia); it is the normal orientation among healthy persons. But there is also to be found in others a deep attraction to death which, following Unamuno's classic speech made at the University of Salamanca (1938), I call necrophilia. It is the attitude which a Franco general, Millán Astray, expressed in the slogan "Long live death, thus provoking Unamuno’s protest against this "necrophilous and senseless cry." Who is a necrophilous person? He is one who is attracted to and fascinated by all that is not alive, to all that is dead; to corpses, to decay, to feces, to dirt. Necrophiles are those people who love to talk about sickness, burials, death. They come to life precisely when they can talk about death. A clear example of the pure necrophilous type was Hitler. He was fascinated by destruction, and the smell of death was sweet to him. While in the years of success it may have appeared that he wanted only to destroy those whom he considered his enemies, the days of the Götterdämmerung at the end showed that his deepest satisfaction lay in witnessing total and absolute destruction: that of the German people, of those around him, and of himself. The necrophilous dwell in the past, never in the future. Their feelings are essentially sentimental; that is, they nurse the memory of feelings which they had yesterday--or believe that they had. They are cold, distant, devotees of "law and order." Their values are precisely the reverse of the values we connect with normal life; not life, but death excites and satisfies them. If one wants to understand the influence of men like Hitler and Stalin, it lies precisely in their unlimited capacity and willingness to kill. For this they' were loved by the necrophiles. Of the rest, many were afraid of them and so preferred to admire, rather than to be aware of, their fear. Many others did not sense the necrophilous quality of these leaders and saw in them the builders, saviors, good fathers. If the necrophilous leaders had not pretended that they were builders and protectors, the number of people attracted to them would hardly have been sufficient to help them seize power, and the number of those repelled by them would probably soon have led to their downfall. While life is characterized by growth in a structured, functional manner, the necrophilous principle is all that which does not grow, that which is mechanical. The necrophilous person is driven by the desire to transform the organic into the inorganic, to approach life mechanically, as if all living persons were things. All living processes, feelings, and thoughts are transformed into things. Memory, rather than experience--having, rather than being--are what counts. The necrophilous person can relate to an object--a flower or a person--only if he possesses it; hence, a threat to his possession is a threat to himself; if he loses possession he loses contact with the world. That is why we find the paradoxical reaction that he would rather lose life than possession, even though, by losing life, he who possesses has ceased to exist. He loves control, and in the act of controlling he kills life. He is deeply afraid of life, because it is disorderly and uncontrollable by its very nature. The woman who wrongly claims to be the mother of the child in the story of Solomon's judgment is typical of this tendency; she would rather have a properly divided dead child than lose a living one. To the necrophilous person justice means correct division, and they are willing to kill or die for the sake of what they call, justice. "Law and order" for them are idols, and everything that threatens law and order is felt as a satanic attack against their supreme values. The necrophilous person is attracted to darkness and night. In mythology and poetry (as well as in dreams) he is attracted to caves, or to the depth of the ocean, or depicted as being blind. (The trolls in Ibsen's Peer Gynt are a good example.) All that is away from or directed against life attracts him. He wants to return to the darkness {23} of the womb, to the past of inorganic or subhuman existence. He is essentially oriented to the past, not to the future, which he hates and fears. Related to this is his craving for certainty. But life is never certain, never predictable, never controllable; in order to make life controllable, it must be transformed into death; death, indeed, is the only thing about life that is certain to him. The necrophilous person can often be recognized by his looks and his gestures. He is cold, his skin looks dead, and often he has an expression on his face as though he were smelling a bad odor. (This expression could be clearly seen in Hitler's face.) He is orderly and obsessive. This aspect of the necrophilous person has been demonstrated to the world in the figure of Eichmann. Eichmann was fascinated by order and death. His supreme values were obedience and the proper functioning of the organization. He transported Jews as he would have transported coal. That they were human beings was hardly within the field of his vision; hence, even the problem of his having hated or not hated his victims is irrelevant. He was the perfect bureaucrat who had transformed all life into the administration of things. But examples of the necrophilous character are by no means to be found only among the inquisitors, the Hitlers and the Eichmanns. There are any number of individuals who do not have the opportunity and the power to kill, vet whose necrophilia expresses itself in other and (superficially seen) more harmless ways. An example is the mother who will always be interested in her child's sickness, in his failures, in dark prognoses for the future; at the same time she will not be impressed by a favorable change nor respond to her child's joy, nor will she notice anything new that is growing within him. We might find that her dreams deal with sickness, death, corpses, blood. She does not harm the child in any obvious way, yet she may slowly strangle the child's joy of life, his faith--in growth, and eventually infect him with her own necrophilous orientation. My description may have given the impression that all the features mentioned here are necessarily found in the necrophilous person. It is true that such divergent features as the wish to kill, the worship of force, the attraction to death and dirt, sadism, the wish to transform the organic into the inorganic through "order" are all part of the same basic orientation. Yet so far as individuals are concerned, there are considerable differences with respect to the strength of these respective trends. Any one of the features mentioned here may be more pronounced in one person than in another. Furthermore, the degree to which a person is necrophilous in comparison with his biophilous aspects and the degree to which a person is aware of necrophilous tendencies and rationalizes them vary considerably from person to person. Yet the concept of the necrophilous type is by no means an abstraction or summary of various disparate behavior trends. Necrophilia constitutes a fundamental orientation; it is the one answer to life that is in complete opposition to life; it is the most morbid and the most dangerous among the orientations to life of which man is capable. It is true perversion; while living, not life but death is loved--not growth, but destruction. The necrophilous person, if he dares to be aware of what he feels, expresses the motto of his life when he says: "Long live death!" The opposite of the necrophilous orientation is the biophilous one; its essence is love of life in contrast to love of death. Like necrophilia, biophilia is not constituted by a single trait but represents a total orientation, an entire way of being. It is manifested in a person's bodily processes, in his emotions, in his thoughts, in his gestures; the biophilous orientation expresses itself in the whole man. The person who fully loves life is attracted by the process of life in all spheres. He prefers to construct, rather than to retain. He is capable of wondering, and he prefers to see something new to the security of finding the old confirmed. He loves the adventure of living more than he does certainty. His approach to life is functional rather than mechanical. He sees the whole rather than only the parts, structures rather than summations. He wants to mold and to influence by love, by reason, by his example--not by force, by cutting things apart, by the bureaucratic manner of administering people as if they were things. He enjoys life and all its manifestations, rather than mere excitement. Biophilic ethics has its own principle of good and evil. Good is all that serves life; evil is all that serves death. Good is reverence for life (this is the main thesis of Albert Schweitzer, one of the great representatives of the love of life--both in his writings and in his person), and all that enhances life. Evil is all that stifles life, narrows it down, {24} cuts it into pieces. Thus it is from the standpoint of life-ethics that the Bible mentions as the central sin of the Hebrews: "Because thou didst not serve thy Lord with joy and gladness of heart in the abundance of all things." The conscience of the biophilous person is not one of forcing oneself to refrain from evil and to do good. It is not the superego described by .Freud, a strict taskmaster employing sadism against oneself for the sake of virtue. The biophilous conscience is motivated by its attraction to life and joy; the moral effort consists in strengthening the life loving side in oneself. For this reasons the biophile does not dwell in remorse and guilt, which are, after all, only aspects of self-loathing and sadness. He turns quickly to life and attempts to do good. Spinoza's Ethics is a striking example of biophilic morality. "Pleasure," he says, "in itself is not bad but good; contrariwise, pain in itself is bad." And in the same spirit: "A free man thinks of death least of all things; and his wisdom is a meditation not of death but of life." Love of life underlies the various versions of humanistic philosophy. In various conceptual forms these philosophies are in the same vein as Spinoza's; they express the principle that the same man loves life; that man's aim in life is to be attracted by all that is alive and to separate himself from all that is dead and mechanical. The dichotomy of biophilia-necrophilia is the same as Freud's life-and-death instinct. I believe, as Freud did, that this is the most fundamental polarity that exists. However, there is one important difference. Freud assumes that the striving toward death and toward life are two biologically given tendencies inherent in all living substance that their respective strengths are relatively constant, and that there is only one alternative within the operation of the death instinct--namely, that it can be directed against the outside world or against oneself. In contrast to these assumptions I believe that necrophilia is not a normal biological tendency, but a pathological phenomenon--in fact, the most malignant pathology that exists in mail. What are we, the people of the United States today, with respect to necrophilia and biophilia? Undoubtedly our spiritual tradition is one of love of life. And not only this. Was there ever a culture with more love of "fun" and excitement, or with greater opportunities for the majority to enjoy fun and excitement? But even if this is so, fun and excitement is not the same as joy and love of life; perhaps underneath there is indifference to life, or attraction to death? To answer this question we must consider the nature of our bureaucratized, industrial, mass civilization. Our approach to life becomes increasingly mechanical. The aim of social efforts is to produce things, and. in the process of idolatry of things we transform ourselves into commodities. The question here is not whether they are treated nicely and are well fed (things, too, can be treated nicely); the question is whether people are things or living beings. People love mechanical gadgets more than living beings. The approach to man is intellectualabstract. One is interested in people as objects, in their common properties, in the statistical rules of mass behavior, not in living individuals. All this goes together with the increasing role of bureaucratic methods. In giant centers of production, giant cities, giant countries, men are administered as if they were things; men and their administrators are transformed into things, and they obey the law of things. In a bureaucratically organized and centralized industrialism, men's tastes are manipulated so that they consume maximally and in predictable and profitable directions. Their intelligence and character become standardized by the ever-increasing use of tests, which select the mediocre and unadventurous over the original and daring. Indeed, the bureaucratic-industrial civilization that has been victorious in Europe and North America has created a new type of man. He has been described as the "organization man" and as homo consumens. He is in addition the homo mechanicus. By this I mean a "gadget man," deeply attracted to all that is mechanical and inclined against all that is alive. It is, of course, true that man's biological and physiological equipment provides him with such strong sexual impulses that even the homo mechanicus still has sexual desires and looks for women. But there is no doubt that the gadget man's interest in women is diminishing. A New Yorker cartoon pointed to this very amusingly: a sales girl trying to sell a certain brand of perfume to a young female customer recommends it by remarking, "It smells like a new sports car." Indeed, any observer of men's behavior today will confirm that this cartoon is more than a clever joke. There are apparently a great number of men who are more interested in sports-cars, television and radio sets, space travel, and any number of gadgets than they are in women, love, nature, food; who are more stimulated by the manipulation of non-organic, mechanical things than by life. Their attitude toward a woman is like that toward a car: you push the button and watch it race. It is not even too farfetched to assume that homo mechanicus has more pride in and is more fascinated by, devices that can kill millions of people across a distance of several thousands of miles within minutes than he is frightened and depressed by the possibility of such mass destruction. Homo mechanicus still likes sex {25} and drink. But all these pleasures are sought for in the frame of reference of the mechanical and the unalive. He expects that there must be a button which, if pushed, brings happiness, love, pleasure. (Many go to a psychoanalyst under the illusion that he can teach them to find the button.) The homo mechanicus becomes more and more interested in the manipulation of machines, rather than in the participation in and response to life. Hence he becomes indifferent to life, fascinated by the mechanical, and eventually attracted by death and total destruction. This affinity between the love of destruction and the love of the mechanical may well have been expressed for the first time in Marinetti's Futurist Manifesto (1909). "A roaring motor-car, which looks as though running on a shrapnel is more beautiful than the Victory of Samothrace. … We wish to glorify war--the only health-giver of the world-militarism, patriotism, the destructive arm of the Anarchist, the beautiful Ideas that kill the contempt for woman." Briefly then, intellectualization, quantification, abstractification, bureaucratization, and reification--the very characteristics of modern industrial society--when applied to people rather than to things are not the principles of life but those of mechanics. People living in such a system must necessarily become indifferent to life, even attracted to death. They are not aware of this. They take the thrills of excitement for the joys of life and live under the illusion that they are very much alive when they only have many things to own and to use. The lack of protest against nuclear war and the discussion of our "atomologists" of the balance sheet of total or half-total destruction show how far we have already gone into the "valley of the shadow of death."1 To speak of the necrophilous quality of our industrial civilization does not imply that industrial production as such is necessarily contrary to the principles of life. The question is whether the principles of social organization and of life are subordinated to those of mechanization, or whether the principles of life are the dominant ones. Obviously, the industrialized world has not found thus far an answer, to the question posed here: How is it possible to create a humanist industrialism as against the bureaucratic mass industrialism that rules our lives today? The danger of nuclear war is so grave that man may arrive at a new barbarism before he has even a chance to find the road to a humanist industrialism. Yet not all hope is lost; hence we might ask ourselves whether the hypothesis developed here could in any way contribute to finding peaceful solutions. I believe it might be useful in several ways. First of all, an awareness of our pathological situation, while not yet a cure, is nevertheless a first step. If more people became aware of the difference between love of life and love of death, if they became aware that they themselves are already far gone in the direction of indifference or of necrophilia, this shock alone could produce new and healthy reactions. Furthermore, the sensitivity toward those who recommend death might be increased. Many might see through the pious rationalizations of the death lovers and change their admiration for them to disgust. Beyond this, our hypothesis would suggest one thing to those concerned with peace and survival: that every effort must be made to weaken the attraction of death and to strengthen the attraction of life. Why not declare that there is only one truly dangerous subversion, the subversion of life? Why do not those who represent the traditions of religion and humanism speak up and say that there is no deadlier sin than love for death and contempt for life? Why not encourage our best brains--scientists, artists, educators--to make suggestions on how to arouse and stimulate love for life as opposed to love for gadgets? I know love for gadgets brings profits to the corporations, while love for life requires fewer things and hence is less profitable. Maybe it is too late. Maybe the neutron bomb, which leaves entire cities intact, but without life, is to be the symbol of our civilization. But again, those of us who love life will not cease the struggle against necrophilia.

## T

#### Interpretation—“economic engagement” means the aff must be an exclusively economic action

Jakstaite 10 - Doctoral Candidate Vytautas Magnus University Faculty of Political Sciences and Diplomacy (Lithuania) (Gerda, “CONTAINMENT AND ENGAGEMENT AS MIDDLE-RANGE THEORIES” BALTIC JOURNAL OF LAW & POLITICS VOLUME 3, NUMBER 2 (2010), DOI: 10.2478/v10076-010-0015-7)

The approach to engagement as economic engagement focuses exclusively on economic instruments of foreign policy with the main national interest being security. Economic engagement is a policy of the conscious development of economic relations with the adversary in order to change the target state‟s behaviour and to improve bilateral relations.94 Economic engagement is academically wielded in several respects. It recommends that the state engage the target country in the international community (with the there existing rules) and modify the target state‟s run foreign policy, thus preventing the emergence of a potential enemy.95 Thus, this strategy aims to ensure safety in particular, whereas economic benefit is not a priority objective. Objectives of economic engagement indicate that this form of engagement is designed for relations with problematic countries – those that pose a potential danger to national security of a state that implements economic engagement. Professor of the University of California Paul Papayoanou and University of Maryland professor Scott Kastner say that economic engagement should be used in relations with the emerging powers: countries which accumulate more and more power, and attempt a new division of power in the international system – i.e., pose a serious challenge for the status quo in the international system (the latter theorists have focused specifically on China-US relations). These theorists also claim that economic engagement is recommended in relations with emerging powers whose regimes are not democratic – that is, against such players in the international system with which it is difficult to agree on foreign policy by other means.96 Meanwhile, other supporters of economic engagement (for example, professor of the University of California Miles Kahler) are not as categorical and do not exclude the possibility to realize economic engagement in relations with democratic regimes.97 Proponents of economic engagement believe that the economy may be one factor which leads to closer relations and cooperation (a more peaceful foreign policy and the expected pledge to cooperate) between hostile countries – closer economic ties will develop the target state‟s dependence on economic engagement implementing state for which such relations will also be cost-effective (i.e., the mutual dependence). However, there are some important conditions for the economic factor in engagement to be effective and bring the desired results. P. Papayoanou and S. Kastner note that economic engagement gives the most positive results when initial economic relations with the target state is minimal and when the target state‟s political forces are interested in development of international economic relations. Whether economic relations will encourage the target state to develop more peaceful foreign policy and willingness to cooperate will depend on the extent to which the target state‟s forces with economic interests are influential in internal political structure. If the target country‟s dominant political coalition includes the leaders or groups interested in the development of international economic relations, economic ties between the development would bring the desired results. Academics note that in non-democratic countries in particular leaders often have an interest to pursue economic cooperation with the powerful economic partners because that would help them maintain a dominant position in their own country.98 Proponents of economic engagement do not provide a detailed description of the means of this form of engagement, but identify a number of possible variants of engagement: conditional economic engagement, using the restrictions caused by economic dependency and unconditional economic engagement by exploiting economic dependency caused by the flow. Conditional economic engagement, sometimes called linkage or economic carrots engagement, could be described as conflicting with economic sanctions. A state that implements this form of engagement instead of menacing to use sanctions for not changing policy course promises for a target state to provide more economic benefits in return for the desired political change. Thus, in this case economic ties are developed depending on changes in the target state‟s behaviour.99 Unconditional economic engagement is more moderate form of engagement. Engagement applying state while developing economic relations with an adversary hopes that the resulting economic dependence over time will change foreign policy course of the target state and reduce the likelihood of armed conflict. Theorists assume that economic dependence may act as a restriction of target state‟s foreign policy or as transforming factor that changes target state‟s foreign policy objectives.100 Thus, economic engagement focuses solely on economic measures (although theorists do not give a more detailed description), on strategically important actors of the international arena and includes other types of engagement, such as the conditional-unconditional economic engagement.

#### Violation—the affirmative uses social assistance---that’s not economic

#### Voting issue—

#### Limits—they explode the topic—blurring the lines between economic and other forms of engagement makes any interaction with another country topical—it’s impossible to predict or prepare

## PTX

#### Obama’s political capital is successfully holding off a sanctions vote now—it’s key to Reid which is the linchpin for holding off a vote.

Rubin 2/11/14

Jennifer, Staff writer at Washington Post, Reid under fire for defying majority on sanctions, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2014/02/11/reid-under-fire-for-defying-majority-on-sanctions/>

The largest and most dependable pro-Israel group, Christians United for Israel, is going after Sen. Harry Reid (D-Nev.) **for bottling up a vote on Iran sanctions**, which a bipartisan majority in the Senate supports. It sent out an alert to its six-figure strong membership [UPDATE: A CUFI rep says the membership is now 1.6 million] making the case that “if this bill were ever brought for a vote, it would pass the Senate by a wide margin. But one man, Senate Majority Leader Harry **Reid**, is preventing this bill from ever seeing the light of day. We know that Harry Reid is under enormous pressure from President Obama. But this is no excuse for putting partisan politics before the security of his country and the will of the people.” After just three hours, the message generated 10,000 calls or e-mails to Reid, according to a CUFI representative. By focusing on just Reid, CUFI is, in my estimation wisely, making the point that this is not Democrat vs. Republican, but White House and Reid vs. a bipartisan coalition. CUFI executive director David Brog explained to me the reasoning behind the sanctions push: “Not to act is to act. Kicking the sanctions can down the road is simply going to force us to choose between two horribles — a nuclear Iran or war with Iran.” He adds, “Now that our economic pressure is working, we must press our advantage as the only alternative to reinvigorate diplomacy and ensure a deal can be made that doesn’t simply ratify Iran’s nuclear capability. “We’re supporting it with everything we’ve got for one simple reason — there may not be another chance.” Brog also argued, “When it came to judicial nominees, he lectured the country at great length about the need for majority rule. But now that we’re debating a fundamental issue of war and peace, he’s blocking the clear will of a large majority without the slightest compunction.” **I don’t believe CUFI is under any illusion that Reid will see the light on either substantive policy grounds or on procedural consistency** (perish the thought). But it is incumbent on those advocates who in the weeks and months ahead may be advocating more confrontational measures to halt Iran’s nuclear weapons program to make every effort to support lesser, alternative steps first. They can’t help it if the president refuses to take up those measures.

#### Plan requires political capital

OECD 9 (ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, Managing for Development Results, <http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/42447575.pdf>, March 2009) \*\*MfDR is Managing for Development Results\*\*

No two countries implement MfDR in exactly the same way. While changes in planning and budgeting processes are the most common and logical entry points for improving the approach, some countries have begun with changes in monitoring and evaluation of programmes, changes in civil service procedures, or changes in project planning and selection. Each of these actions, properly conceived and executed, can yield tangible results and support a cycle of performance improvement. Launching a serious MfDR process usually requires committed leaders with extensive credibility and a willingness to spend political capital to reform entrenched systems and improve government performance. The 2008 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration, which examines progress on aid effectiveness, found that the proportion of countries with “largely developed results-oriented frameworks” was a modest 5%. However, 56% of countries reported having taken some action since 2005. Experience suggests that fully institutionalising the approach takes a minimum of seven years. In most countries, this means that the process spans at least one political transition, and much of that time is taken up with important but relatively unglamorous efforts to change core systems and assemble a valid empirical basis for decisions. For this reason, it is essential to develop constituencies inside and outside of government and to ensure that the process is not seen as partisan or donor driven. N

#### Causes Israel strikes

Jon Perr 12/24/13**,** B.A. in Political Science from Rutgers University; technology marketing consultant based in Portland, Oregon, has long been active in Democratic politics and public policy as an organizer and advisor in California and Massachusetts. His past roles include field staffer for Gary Hart for President (1984), organizer of Silicon Valley tech executives backing President Clinton's call for national education standards (1997), recruiter of tech executives for Al Gore's and John Kerry's presidential campaigns, and co-coordinator of MassTech for Robert Reich (2002).(Jon, “Senate sanctions bill could let Israel take U.S. to war against Iran” Daily Kos, [http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/12/24/1265184/-Senate-sanctions-bill-could-let-Israel-take-U-S-to-war-against-Iran#](http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/12/24/1265184/-Senate-sanctions-bill-could-let-Israel-take-U-S-to-war-against-Iran)

As 2013 draws to close, the negotiations over the Iranian nuclear program have entered a delicate stage. But in 2014, the tensions will escalate dramatically as a bipartisan group of Senators brings a new Iran sanctions bill to the floor for a vote. As many others have warned, that promise of new measures against Tehran will almost certainly blow up the interim deal reached by the Obama administration and its UN/EU partners in Geneva. But Congress' highly unusual intervention into the President's domain of foreign policy doesn't just make the prospect of an American conflict with Iran more likely. As it turns out, the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act essentially empowers Israel to decide whether the United States will go to war against Tehran.¶ On their own, the tough new sanctions imposed automatically if a final deal isn't completed in six months pose a daunting enough challenge for President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry. But it is the legislation's commitment to support an Israeli preventive strike against Iranian nuclear facilities that almost ensures the U.S. and Iran will come to blows. As Section 2b, part 5 of the draft mandates:¶ If the Government of Israel is compelled to take military action in legitimate self-defense against Iran's nuclear weapon program, the United States Government should stand with Israel and provide, in accordance with the law of the United States and the constitutional responsibility of Congress to authorize the use of military force, diplomatic, military, and economic support to the Government of Israel in its defense of its territory, people, and existence.¶ Now, the legislation being pushed by Senators Mark Kirk (R-IL), Chuck Schumer (D-NY) and Robert Menendez (D-NJ) does not automatically give the President an authorization to use force should Israel attack the Iranians. (The draft language above explicitly states that the U.S. government must act "in accordance with the law of the United States and the constitutional responsibility of Congress to authorize the use of military force.") But there should be little doubt that an AUMF would be forthcoming from Congressmen on both sides of the aisle. As Lindsey Graham, who with Menendez co-sponsored a similar, non-binding "stand with Israel" resolution in March told a Christians United for Israel (CUFI) conference in July:¶ "If nothing changes in Iran, come September, October, I will present a resolution that will authorize the use of military force to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear bomb."¶ Graham would have plenty of company from the hardest of hard liners in his party. In August 2012, Romney national security adviser and pardoned Iran-Contra architect Elliott Abrams called for a war authorization in the pages of the Weekly Standard. And just two weeks ago, Norman Podhoretz used his Wall Street Journal op-ed to urge the Obama administration to "strike Iran now" to avoid "the nuclear war sure to come."¶ But at the end of the day, the lack of an explicit AUMF in the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act doesn't mean its supporters aren't giving Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu de facto carte blanche to hit Iranian nuclear facilities. The ensuing Iranian retaliation against to Israeli and American interests would almost certainly trigger the commitment of U.S. forces anyway.¶ Even if the Israelis alone launched a strike against Iran's atomic sites, Tehran will almost certainly hit back against U.S. targets in the Straits of Hormuz, in the region, possibly in Europe and even potentially in the American homeland. Israel would face certain retaliation from Hezbollah rockets launched from Lebanon and Hamas missiles raining down from Gaza.¶ That's why former Bush Defense Secretary Bob Gates and CIA head Michael Hayden raising the alarms about the "disastrous" impact of the supposedly surgical strikes against the Ayatollah's nuclear infrastructure. As the New York Times reported in March 2012, "A classified war simulation held this month to assess the repercussions of an Israeli attack on Iran forecasts that the strike would lead to a wider regional war, which could draw in the United States and leave hundreds of Americans dead, according to American officials." And that September, a bipartisan group of U.S. foreign policy leaders including Brent Scowcroft, retired Admiral William Fallon, former Republican Senator (now Obama Pentagon chief) Chuck Hagel, retired General Anthony Zinni and former Ambassador Thomas Pickering concluded that American attacks with the objective of "ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear bomb" would "need to conduct a significantly expanded air and sea war over a prolonged period of time, likely several years." (Accomplishing regime change, the authors noted, would mean an occupation of Iran requiring a "commitment of resources and personnel greater than what the U.S. has expended over the past 10 years in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars combined.") The anticipated blowback?¶ Serious costs to U.S. interests would also be felt over the longer term, we believe, with problematic consequences for global and regional stability, including economic stability. A dynamic of escalation, action, and counteraction could produce serious unintended consequences that would significantly increase all of these costs and lead, potentially, to all-out regional war.

#### Great power war

Rafael Reuveny 10, PhD, Professor in the School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University, "Unilateral Strike on Iran could trigger world Depression", Op-ed distributed through McClatchy Newspaper Co, <http://www.indiana.edu/~spea/news/speaking_out/reuveny_on_unilateral_strike_Iran.shtml>

A unilateral Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would likely have dire consequences, including a regional war, global economic collapse and a major power clash. For an Israeli campaign to succeed, it must be quick and decisive. This requires an attack that would be so overwhelming that Iran would not dare to respond in full force. Such an outcome is extremely unlikely since the locations of some of Iran’s nuclear facilities are not fully known and known facilities are buried deep underground. All of these widely spread facilities are shielded by elaborate air defense systems constructed not only by the Iranians, but also the Chinese and, likely, the Russians as well. By now, Iran has also built redundant command and control systems and nuclear facilities, developed early-warning systems, acquired ballistic and cruise missiles and upgraded and enlarged its armed forces. Because Iran is well-prepared, a single, conventional Israeli strike — or even numerous strikes — could not destroy all of its capabilities, giving Iran time to respond. A regional war Unlike Iraq, whose nuclear program Israel destroyed in 1981**,** Iran has a second-strike capability comprised of a coalition of Iranian, Syrian, Lebanese, Hezbollah, Hamas, and, perhaps, Turkish forces. Internal pressure might compel Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority to join the assault, turning a bad situation into a regional war. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, at the apex of its power, Israel was saved from defeat by President Nixon’s shipment of weapons and planes. Today, Israel’s numerical inferiority is greater, and it faces more determined and better-equipped opponents. Despite Israel’s touted defense systems, Iranian coalition missiles, armed forces, and terrorist attacks would likely wreak havoc on its enemy, leading to a prolonged tit-for-tat. In the absence of massive U.S. assistance, Israel’s military resources may quickly dwindle, forcing it to use its alleged nuclear weapons, as it had reportedly almost done in 1973. An Israeli nuclear attack would likely destroy most of Iran’s capabilities, but a crippled Iran and its coalition could still attack neighboring oil facilities, unleash global terrorism, plant mines in the Persian Gulf and impair maritime trade in the Mediterranean, Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Middle Eastern oil shipments would likely slow to a trickle as production declines due to the war and insurance companies decide to drop their risky Middle Eastern clients. Iran and Venezuela would likely stop selling oil to the United States and Europe. The world economy would head into a tailspin; international acrimony would rise; and Iraqi and Afghani citizens might fully turn on the United States, immediately requiring the deployment of more American troops. Russia, China, Venezuela, and maybe Brazil and Turkey — all of which essentially support Iran — could be tempted to form an alliance and openly challenge the U.S. hegemony. Replaying Nixon’s nightmare Russia and China might rearm their injured Iranian protege overnight, just as Nixon rearmed Israel, and threaten to intervene, just as the U.S.S.R. threatened to join Egypt and Syria in 1973. President Obama’s response would likely put U.S. forces on nuclear alert, replaying Nixon’s nightmarish scenario. Iran may well feel duty-bound to respond to a unilateral attack by its Israeli archenemy, but it knows that it could not take on the United States head-to-head. In contrast, if the United States leads the attack, Iran’s response would likely be muted. If Iran chooses to absorb an American-led strike, its allies would likely protest and send weapons, but would probably not risk using force.

¶ While no one has a crystal ball, leaders should be risk-averse when choosing war as a foreign policy tool. If attacking Iran is deemed necessary, Israel must wait for an American green light. A unilateral Israeli strike could ultimately spark World War III.

## DA

#### China is investing in PEMEX now – plan pushes them out

Yang ‘13

(Yang Jingjie is a reporter for Global Times. Global Times a daily Chinese tabloid focusing on international issues. “Increase in Mexican oil exports indicates thawing ties”, Global Times, April 9, 2013, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/773515.shtml#.Ueht4I1OSSo)

Observers say Mexican state oil company Pemex's decision to significantly boost oil exports to China will help optimize the imbalanced bilateral trade structure and indicates thawing ties following their leadership transitions. On the sidelines of the Boao Forum for Asia on Saturday, Pemex Chief Executive Emilio Lozoya said the company would begin increasing exports to China by 30,000 barrels a day starting this month, according to a two-year agreement between Pemex and China's Sinopec, Reuters reported. The level of exports to China could increase over time as part of the agreement, he added. Mexico, the seventh largest oil producer in the world, exports nearly 80 percent of its oil to the US and only some 50,000 barrels to China each month, according to China Radio International. Lin Boqiang, director of the China Center for Energy Economics Research at Xiamen University, told the Global Times that the increase stemmed from China's potential for growth in demand, against the backdrop of shrinking US imports as a result of its shale boom. A report released by OPEC last week expected China to overtake the US as the world's largest oil importer by 2014. This would also diversify China's sources of oil imports, "as only about 9 percent of the imports came from Latin America last year," Lin added. Data from the China Petroleum and Chemical Industry Federation showed last year nearly half of China's oil imports came from the Middle East. Yang Zhimin, a researcher with the Institute of Latin American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times that the supply of oil is not solely decided by market demands, given its strategic nature. "We can't rule out the possibility of US influence in Mexico's decision, but the current president Enrique Pena Nieto won't follow the US as closely as his predecessor did." Pena Nieto, who is from the center-left Institutional Revolutionary Party, last year replaced rightist Felipe Calderon as president. Yang noted that the visit by Pena Nieto, which was paid just weeks after Xi became president, was a move aimed at mending bilateral ties. His predecessor Calderon met the Dalai Lama in 2011, drawing discontent and objection from Beijing. Yang said the new oil deal would also help narrow the bilateral trade imbalance. Mexico said its trade deficit with China reached $51.2 billion in 2012.

#### Engagement is zero-sum

Dowd ‘12

Alan Dowd, Senior Fellow with the American Security Council Foundation, 2012, “Crisis in the America's,” <http://www.ascfusa.org/content_pages/view/crisisinamericas>

Reengagement also means revitalizing security ties. A good model to follow might be what’s happening in China’s backyard. To deter China and prevent an accidental war, the U.S. is reviving its security partnerships all across the Asia-Pacific region. Perhaps it’s time to do the same in Latin America. We should remember that many Latin American countries—from Mexico and Panama to Colombia and Chile—border the Pacific. Given Beijing’s actions, it makes sense to bring these Latin American partners on the Pacific Rim into the alliance of alliances that is already stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region.¶ Finally, all of this needs to be part of a revived Monroe Doctrine.¶ Focusing on Chinese encroachment in the Americas, this “Monroe Doctrine 2.0” would make it clear to Beijing that the United States welcomes China’s efforts to conduct trade in the Americas but discourages any claims of control—implied or explicit—by China over territories, properties or facilities in the Americas. In addition, Washington should make it clear to Beijing that the American people would look unfavorably upon the sale of Chinese arms or the basing of Chinese advisors or military assets in the Western Hemisphere.¶ In short, what it was true in the 19th and 20th centuries must remain true in the 21st: There is room for only one great power in the Western Hemisphere.

#### Key to Chinese oil security

Cerna ‘11 – Michael, China Research Center, China's Growing Presence in Latin America: Implications for U.S. and Chinese Presence in the Region, 4/15/11, <http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-presence-in-latin-america-implications-for-u-s-and-chinese-presence-in-the-region/>]

China’s thirst for natural resources has sent the country in search of sustainable supplies of oil, soy and iron ore. In South America, China has found some of the most well-endowed partners in the world. China is devouring Latin American commodities and eyeing a market of 500 million people. “Countries in South America have arable land and need our technology and investment, and they welcome our companies. It’s a win-win solution,” said Wang Yunkun, deputy director of the Agriculture and Rural Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress, as reported by MercoPress. In 2006, more than 36% of Chile’s total exports were directed toward Asia, with China taking 12% of the total. Chile was the first Latin American country to complete a major bilateral trade agreement with China (Santiso, 2007). Since then China has looked beyond Chile, also targeting Brazil, Venezuela, Ecuador, Argentina and Peru. In 2009, China became Brazil’s largest single export market, eclipsing the U.S. for the first time in history. Later, Brazil’s then-president, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, and his Chinese counterpart, Hu Jintao, signed an agreement that allowed the China Development Bank and Sinopec to loan Brazil’s state-controlled oil company, Petrobras, $10 billion in return for as many as 200,000 barrels a day of crude oil for ten years (Economist, 2009). This is but one example of how China is seizing lending opportunities in Latin America when traditional lenders such as the Inter-American Development Bank are being pushed to their limits. “Just one of China’s loans, the $10 billion for Brazil’s national oil company, is almost as much as the $11.2 billion in all approved financing by the Inter-American Bank in 2008,” according to The New York Times. It was not only in Brazil that China went after oil. In order to meet rising industrial needs and consumer demand, China has pursued investments and agreements with a variety of Latin American oil producers. In 2007 Venezuela agreed to a $6 billion joint investment fund for infrastructure projects at home and for oil refineries in China able to process Venezuelan heavy crude oil (Santiso, 2007). Venezuela planned to increase oil exports to China by 300,000 barrels per day. Then in 2009, Venezuela announced a $16 billion investment deal with the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) for oil exploration in the Orinoco River to develop heavy crude oil resources (Economist, 2009). Meanwhile, the CNPC has invested $300 million in technology to use Venezuela’s Orimulsion fuel in Chinese power plants. This exemplifies Venezuela’s desire to break away from the U.S. During a visit to China in 2004, President Chavez said shifting exports to China would help end dependency on sales to the United States (Johnson, 2005).

#### Asia war

Brandenburg 3/24/20**’**11 Colonel James A. – United States Air Force, China’s Energy Insecurity and the South China Sea Dispute, USAWC Strategy Research Project, p. 6-7

In 2010, China reasserted ownership to nearly 80 percent of the South China Sea, supplementing its claims to the Spratly and Paracel Islands. For China and its neighbors, territorial ownership is integral to state sovereignty and security. However, overlapping EEZs, disputes over ownership of the Spratly and Paracel Islands, and China’s mercantilist approach to securing resources stand to raise the energy security stakes of interested parties including the US.16 Feelings of insecurity of those with competing interests in either the EEZ or the Spratly or Paracel Islands could prove challenging especially if China expands its offshore production of oil/natural gas and extends its control over the vessels or pipelines that deliver them via the South China Sea. Experts suggest energy shortages provide the necessary catalyst for arms races, nuclear proliferation, and other forms of instability… in essence, greater energy insecurity equates to the greater probability of geopolitical rivalry.17 Like the US, as China becomes more dependent on oil imports, its ability to ensure access to energy at an affordable price becomes even more critical and could prove difficult given increasing global market uncertainty. Ultimately, China’s dependence on imports could lead to a vicious cycle as it struggles to find ways to mitigate risks and protect its investments in order to offset its insecurity.18 Given global dependence on China’s economy and the potential impact of shrinking energy supplies, this warrants special consideration in the geo-political realm.

## K

#### The affirmatives strategy of development is rooted in racist assumptions of the “developing world”---economic engagement with Mexico is always predicated on the Western agenda

Grosfoguel 2K (Ramon, Associate Professor of Ethnic Studies at the University of California Berkeley, “Developmentalism, Modernity, and Dependency Theory in Latin America”, Nepantla: Views from South, Vol. 1 Iss. 2, p. 347-374)

Developmentalism became a global ideology of the capitalist world-economy. In the Latin American periphery these ideas were appropriated in the late eighteenth century by the Spanish Creole elites, who adapted them to their own agenda. Since most of the elites were linked to, or part of, the agrarian landowner class, which produced goods through coerced forms of labor to sell for a profit in the world market, they were very eclectic in their selection of which Enlightenment ideas they wished to utilize. Free trade and national sovereignty were ideas they defended as part of their struggle against the Spanish colonial monopoly of trade. However, for racial and class reasons, the modern ideas about individual freedom, rights of man, and equality were underplayed. There were no major social transformations of Latin American societies after the inde- pendence revolutions of the first half of the nineteenth century. The Creole elites left untouched the colonial noncapitalist forms of coerced labor as well as the racial/ethnic hierarchies. White Creole elites maintained after independence a racial hierarchy where Indians, blacks, mestizos, mulattoes and other racially oppressed groups were located at the bottom. This is what Aníbal Quijano (1993) calls “coloniality of power.” During the nineteenth century, Great Britain had become the new core power and the new model of civilization. The Latin American Creole elites established a discursive opposition between Spain’s “backwardness, obscurantism and feudalism” and Great Britain’s “advanced, civilized and modern” nation. Leopoldo Zea, paraphrasing José Enrique Rodó, called this the new “northernmania” (nordomanía), that is, the attempt by Creole elites to see new “models” in the North that would stimulate develop- ment while in turn developing new forms of colonialism (Zea 1986, 16–17). The subsequent nineteenth-century characterization by the Creole elites of Latin America as “feudal” or in a backward “stage” served to justify Latin American subordination to the new masters from the North and is part of what I call “feudalmania,” which would continue throughout the twentieth century. Feudalmania was a device of “temporal distancing” (Fabian 1983) to produce a knowledge that denied coevalness between Latin America and the so-called advanced European countries. The denial of coevalness created a double ideological mechanism. First, it concealed European responsibil- ity in the exploitation of the Latin American periphery. By not sharing the same historical time and existing in different geographical spaces, each region’s destiny was conceived as unrelated to each other region’s. Second, living different temporalities, where Europe was said to be at a more advanced stage of development than Latin America, reproduced a notion of European superiority. Thus Europe was the “model” to imitate and the developmentalist goal was to “catch up.” This is expressed in the dichotomy civilization/barbarism seen in figures such as Domingo Faustino Sarmiento in Argentina. The use of both neomercantilist and liberal economic ideas enabled the nineteenth-century Iberoamerican elites to oscillate between protectionist and free-trade positions depending on the fluctuations of the world economy. When they were benefiting from producing agrarian or mining exports in the international division of labor dominated at the time by British imperialism, liberal economic theories provided them with the rational justification for their role and goals. But when foreign competition or a world economic crisis was affecting their exports to the world market, they shifted production toward the internal markets and employed neomercantilist arguments to justify protectionist policies. In Chile, Argentina, and Mexico there were neomercantilist and economic nationalist arguments that anticipated many of the arguments developed one hundred years later by the Prebisch-CEPAL school1 and by some of the dependentis- tas (Potasch 1959; Frank 1970; Chiaramonte 1971). For example, the 1870s developmentalist debate was the most important economic debate in Ar- gentina during the nineteenth century and one of the most important in Latin America. An industrial development plan using protectionist neomercantilist policies was proposed. This movement was led by a profes- sor of political economy at the University of Buenos Aires and member of the Cámara de Diputados, Vicente F. López. López’s group was supported by the agrarian landowners, artisans, peasants, and incipient industrial cap- italists. Although all of them were protectionists, not all were economic nationalists. The protectionist position of the agrarian landowners was due to the 1866 and 1873 world economic crises, which had negatively affected export prices on wool, Argentina’s major export item at the time. Thus López promoted the development of a national cloth industry as a tran- sitional solution to the world depression. The movement ended once the wool producers shifted to cattle raising and meat exports. However, the group of deputies led by López developed neomer- cantilist and economic nationalist arguments that anticipated many of the arguments developed one hundred years later by the Prebisch-CEPAL school and by some of the dependentistas. Influenced by the late 1830s Argen- tinean romantic generation (e.g., Juan Bautista Alberdi, Esteban Echevar- ria), López defended a historicist/idiographic approach against the univer- salism of liberal political economists (Chiaramonte 1971, 128–29, 133–34). According to López, the idea of free trade is not an absolute principle; rather, its application depends on the particular conditions of each coun- try. If free trade was beneficial for the industrial development of foreign countries, in the Argentinean case, where different industrial and eco- nomic structures were present, free trade was not a solution. In the first phase of industrial development, industries need protection from foreign competition. As one of the protectionist group members, Lucio V. López, said in 1873, “It is a mistake to believe that political economy offers and contains inmutable principles for all nations” (Chiaramonte 1971, 129–30). This critique of the nomothetic/universalist approach of core state intellec- tuals is even stronger in the thesis of one of Vicente F. López’s disciples, Aditardo Heredia, who attacked European intellectuals’ social conceptions as ahistorical and metaphysical. Heredia criticized in particular the Eu- ropean Enlightenment thinkers for aspiring to develop a social science guided by universal and inflexible principles, similar to geometric theorems or algebraic formulas, without attention to the peculiar historical condi- tions of each nation (130). Carlos Pellegrini, one of the leading protectionist deputies, said as early as 1853 that Adam Smith’s beautiful deductions did not pay enough attention to an aspect that influences all human institutions: time (133). The debate was a classical nomothetic-idiographic confronta- tion. The Argentinean scholars opposed a theory based on a concept of an eternal time/space with more particularistic and historicist arguments. The originality of their arguments was to articulate an economic policy in support of a nationalist industrialization project in the periphery of the world economy and to identify relations with England as part of the source of Argentina’s underdevelopment. The economic nationalism of Vicente F. López and his group offered a critique of the dependent relations of Argentina with England and other European centers as early as the 1870s (Chiaramonte 1971, 192–93). Regarding this point, we can quote the following statements made by this protectionist group, which can show some similarities with certain CEPAL-dependentista positions one hundred years later: It is very beautiful...to speak of free trade...this word freedom . . . is so beautiful! But we must understand freedom. For the English who favor free trade, freedom is to allow English factories to manufacture the foreign products, to allow the English merchant to sell the foreign product. This type of freedom transforms the rest of the world into tributary countries; while England is the only nation that enjoys freedom, the remainder are tributary nations; but I do not understand free trade in this manner. By free trade I understand an exchange of finished goods for finished goods. The day our wool can be exported not in the form of a raw material, but rather as a finished frock coat in exchange for England’s iron needles or clock strings, then I would accept free trade, that is, a fin- ished product from our country for a finished product from England. But if free trade consists of sending our wool . . . so England may wash it (when I speak of England I also mean Eu- rope and the rest of the world), manufacture it, and sell it to us through English merchants, brought on English ships and sold by English agents, I do not understand; this is not free trade, this is making a country that does not possess this industry a tributary country. Thus, let’s follow the path of protectionism, given that if we see the history of the manufacturing countries, we will find that their progress is due to protectionism. (Speech by Finance Minister Rufino Varela in the legislature in 1876; cited in Chiaramonte 1971, 182–83) In the English Parliament, one of the illustrious defenders of free trade said that he would like, upholding his doctrine, to make of England the factory of the world and of America the farm of England. He said something very true . . . that to a great extent has been realized, because in effect we are and will be for a long time, if we do not solve this problem, the farm of the great manufacturing nations. (Speech by Carlos Pellegrini at the Cámara de Diputados in 1875; 189) It is impossible to be independent when a country is not self- sufficient, when it does not have all it needs to consume. . . . I know well what the remedies are: they are to have capital to pay ourselves for the elaboration of products and their adaptation for consumption. Only in this way would the country have independence and credit and be saved through its own efforts. (Speech by Vicente F. López at the Cámara de Diputados in 1875; 27) It has been recognized that political independence cannot exist without industrial and mercantile independence. (Speech by a protectionist deputy in 1874; 192) (It is not necessary) to be permanently dependent on foreign capital. . . . I am completely opposed to the establishment of companies with foreign capital. (Deputy Seeber in 1877; 185) Although this nationalist group was questioning the tenets of tra- ditional liberal political economy and the location of Argentina within the world division of labor (Chiaramonte 1971, 193), it is important to indicate that they were committed to a nationalist liberalism. They de- fended protectionism as a transitory, although necessary, stage to direct the country toward economic liberalism. They criticized the supporters of the free-market doctrine because this policy maintained the subordination of Argentina to England. They wished to restrict momentarily the full im- plementation of economic liberalism as a means of achieving it later: The newborn industries needed protection, but once they grew, free markets should be encouraged (191). This doctrine is very close to those of the Ger- man political economist Frederich List and the North American Casey, who also promoted protectionism against England as a necessary develop- mental stage. However, although their names were mentioned several times during the 1870s parliamentary debate (135), the dominant influence upon the Argentinian protectionists in the 1870s came from their own intellec- tual tradition (134–35). In sum, they were commited to national capitalist development through the formation of a local industrial bourgeoisie. Other countries in Latin America, such as Mexico (Potasch 1959) and Chile (Frank 1970) had similar debates during the nineteenth century. Probably the most extreme case in terms of the free-trade and protectionist debates was nineteenth-century Paraguay, where a protectionist regime led by Dr. Francia and the López family was destroyed by a military inter- vention of Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina, aided by the British, to install a free-trade regime. Six out of seven Paraguayan males were killed in the Triple Alliance War. This war was a turning point for the triumph of the free-trade doctrine, which dominated in Latin America during the nineteenth century, the period of British hegemony. Agrarian and mining capitalists profited from selling raw materials or crops to, and buying man- ufactured products from, the British, rather than attempting to compete with them through industrialization. By the end of the nineteenth century, Spencerian evolutionism and Comtian scientism joined forces to form the Latin American version of positivism, which provided the ideological justification for both the economic subordination to the “empire of free trade” and the political domination of the dictatorships of “order and progress.” Scientism, progress, truth, property, evolutionary stagism, and order were all Enlightenment themes reproduced in Auguste Comte’s positivist and Herbert Spencer’s evolution- ary doctrines. They were both used in the Latin American periphery to justify the penetration of foreign capital investments and to promote economic liberalism against “backwardness” and “feudalism.” Evolutionary stagism, inevitable progress, and optimism in science and technology combined to form a teleological view of human history that strengthened the basis of developmentalist ideology. As a result of the U.S. military invasions in the region, the Mexican revolution in 1910, and the disillusionment with liberalism during the First World War, a new wave of nationalism emerged among Latin American elites. Once again, after the First World War, there was a radical questioning of economic liberalism, this time focused against the new hegemon in the region, the United States of America.

#### This fixation on Western development turns the case, destroys the environment, and breeds global self-hatred---the alternative is to reject their framing of the world---change must begin in our minds and the way we think about countries

Mbele ‘12 (Dr. Joseph – prof. of Post-Colonial and Third World Literature, studied in Tanzania, teaches at St. Olaf’s College, has done lots of field work and written a lot of books; writing for The Urban Fly, http://www.theurbanfly.com/Newz/what-is-development-colonialism-deconstructed)

The concept of development is everywhere, in our personal lives and in the lives of communities and countries in general. We all believe that we need development. If we do not strive to develop, we get pressured in one way or another to do so. Other people try to force development on us. In talking about countries, people use the concept of developed countries, developing countries or underdeveloped countries. Accordingly, countries such as the USA, Britain, Sweden, Germany, and Japan are considered developed. However, countries such as Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda are considered developing or underdeveloped. These concepts are firmly entrenched in people’s minds. Do we know what we are talking about, when we use these concepts? Do these concepts make sense? Although I used to think like other people--that there are communities or countries that are developed and others that are developing or underdeveloped--I have discovered that these concepts are faulty and unreasonable. I dare say that these concepts confirm the existence of false consciousness in our heads, the product of faulty education. Why do I say this? First, saying that a certain community or country is developed implies that that community or country has reached the peak and is now static. The truth is that there is no community or country in the world that is static. Every society and every country is changing all the time, in different areas and respects: economic, political, cultural and so on. Even those societies or countries considered developed are changing all the time. The USA of three years ago is different from the USA of today, and the USA of five years to come will be different from that of today. Technological changes, for example, occur all the time. The same happens in other fields, such as culture and education. All countries follow that pattern. Changes never end, whether in Tanzania, England, or the USA. If this process of change means development, then every country in the world is a developing country. Therefore, the idea of there being countries that are developed and others that are developing does not make good sense. It is pointless to place some countries in the category of developed countries while they are, like the other countries, changing all the time. The fundamental issue, however, is the concept of development. We need to ask ourselves: what is development, and who defines it? Who sets the criteria for development?

On the whole, some countries, especially those which ruled us during colonialism--the powerful countries in the present world--are the ones which set the standards of development. Because Europe brags that it is developed, Africans and others around the world accept that notion and look at their own countries as developing or underdeveloped countries. These are neo-colonial ideas, an opium that was spread, and continues to be spread, in schools, the media, and many other institutions. We have to free ourselves mentally, so we can think for ourselves, instead of being parrots. We should have sound heads, which we can use for thinking about these issues ourselves. We have to build such an intellectual foundation, so we can reflect on the concept of development and ask ourselves what development is. In doing so, we ought to ask ourselves whether we have to accept the European concept of development. In thinking about development, we have to assume the duty and obligation of establishing our own criteria and using them. We should build the will to trust in ourselves and make our own decisions for our benefit. Without doing this, we will continue being parrots. Whatever they do in Europe or the USA, whatever exists in Europe or the USA, or whatever comes from there, we will see as development. The way things are, we believe completely that imitating the people of Europe or the USA constitutes development. If they initiate something, we want to imitate it. Our criteria for education, good governance, democracy, and so on are set by them. We have become perpetual followers. In the meantime, the people of Europe and the USA do not see anything of ours as development. It is only when we imitate their things that we get counted as developing. Even if we start anything, they do not see it as development. And we ourselves, looking at Europe and USA, don’t believe that what we do is development. If the thing had started in Europe or USA, we would have seen it as development. Even if something has no meaning, or has negative effects, as long as it is from Europe or the USA, people in our countries see it as development. Even if the things go against humanity, as long as they have come from Europe, our people see them as development. I can offer an example. Countries that are called developed have managed to build big cities, factories and different kinds of infrastructure, thereby appearing developed. Though there is considerable destruction of the environment in this development, the idea that these countries are developed remains intact, and we struggle to imitate them. We toil relentlessly to follow the same path they took, of destroying the environment through building factories and infrastructure. We do not care that what we call development has ruined and continues to ruin the environment. We want factories, without considering the effects on the water we use, the air we breathe, and the environment in general. We do not care that the development of Europe and the USA has destroyed social relationships creating debilitating alienation in people’s lives. Is this development? As I have stated, there is no country that is static, not changing. The mistake we make is not paying attention to this truth and, instead, looking at the countries of Europe and America as developed. Slavishly following everything European or American, we will remain forever in self-contempt, looking at ourselves as developing countries or undeveloped countries. With this perspective, we will never be on the same level as the countries we call developed. As long as we regard ourselves as being backward, we will remain backward. We will remain trapped in the belief that we are developing countries or underdeveloped countries. The people of Europe and America will continue to see what they do as development, and they will continue to push us along the path they see as development. We will continue to be always followers. There are, already, many so called development programs in our country and institutions from outside working on initiatives called development programs. Are we sure that these are not perpetuating the problem I am highlighting? We have an obligation to liberate ourselves mentally and establish our own standards. Without such standards, which would take into account the right of every people in the world to contribute to the formulation of the concept and criteria of development, it is not right to continue talking about developed countries and developing or underdeveloped countries. We have to change our thinking; we should reject the existing tradition of being called or calling ourselves developing countries, a tradition that reflect mental dependency, the mind of parrots, neo-colonialism. The effects of this dependency complex are evident everywhere. When we talk about the economic system, for example, we find ourselves struggling to imitate the reality of Europe and America. When we talk about education, the same applies. We struggle to follow the standards of Europe and America. Today, in our country, if someone starts a school and calls it Cambridge Academy, and another person starts one and calls it Lindi Academy, people will be attracted to the Cambridge Academy, without any thinking. When we talk about beauty, for example, it is the same thing. We follow European and American standards.

## Relations

#### Relations high now

FNL 7/5 [July 5, 2013. Fox News Latino. “U.S. Wants More Intelligence Cooperation With Mexico, White House Report States” http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2013/07/05/us-wants-more-intelligence-cooperation-with-mexico-white-house-report-states/#ixzz2aos85oqW]

A newly released White House report on the U.S. border with Mexico highlights the Obama administration's strategic shift toward forgoing a closer working relationship with its southern neighbor. This, despite recent restrictions by Enrique Peña Nieto's government on who American intelligence services can contact in Mexico. The White House's 2013 National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy illustrated nine points that focus on interdiction, tackling drug cartels along the border, halting money laundering, building up stronger communities and strengthening ties between the two nations in terms of counternarcotics. “The U.S.-Mexican bilateral relationship continues to grow based on strong, multi-layered institutional ties,” the report stated. “Based on principles of shared responsibility, mutual trust, and respect for sovereign independence, the two countries’ efforts have built confidence that continues to transform and strengthen the bilateral relationship in 2013 and beyond.” While the U.S. report touts a need for greater cooperation, new Mexican security policies could hamper that. A recent decision by the Mexican government has ordered a halt in direct communications between American intelligence agencies and their counterparts south of the border. Now instead of directly consulting local law enforcement, agencies like the DEA and FBI will have to contact Mexico's Interior Ministry before being passed along through the proper channels. Intelligence sharing, however, was a major talking point when President Barack Obama met with his Mexican counterpart back in May. Despite scarce details about the meeting, the two leaders discussed border security and the use of drones along the 1,954-mile shared border. Peña Nieto downplayed the notion that the new, more centralized arrangement would damage its security partnership with the United States. He said Obama agreed during their private meeting earlier in the day to "cooperate on the basis of mutual respect" to promote an efficient and effective strategy. "I think the U.S. government wants to make sure that Peña Nieto is on the same page as Obama, that he wants to pursue the cartels as consistently and aggressively as [former Mexican President] Calderón did during his presidency," Alex Sanchez, a security analyst at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, told ABC News. Even as the Obama administration hopes that Peña Nieto will continue to go on the offensive against the drug cartels in Mexico, the report suggests a more humanitarian approach to the drug war. Besides counternarcotics efforts, a solid portion of the report concerns community building measures along the border, ways to deal with substance abuse and violence, as well as health and education programs. “The crime and breakdown in public health and safety that affect many border communities has a close nexus with substance use —including abuse of alcohol and other drugs— can have a far-reaching effect on the resilience of communities,” the report stated. “Heavily Hispanic communities along the border have been particularly hard hit.” The report’s focus on community building seems to go along with Peña Nieto’s strategy in combating the drug war. Instead of the “kingpin” approach that his predecessor Felipe Calderón took, which focused on apprehending or killing high-ranking cartel members, Peña Nieto has moved to a plan to reduce the levels of violence in the country and bolster trust of law enforcement among the populace. The report has some analysts hopeful that there will be better working relations between the U.S. and Mexico, especially in light of the new rules concerning U.S. intelligence agencies. “The election of Peña Nieto sparked vocal concerns among U.S. political leaders over his stated desire to move priorities away from arrests and drug seizures, and towards violence reduction, and there have also been reports of tensions between the incoming government and U.S. officials over the level of U.S. involvement in Mexican security policies,” the Latin American intelligence website Insight Crime stated. “However, the U.S. strategy displays no sign of this friction, only expressing a desire to increase cooperation, which despite the public murmuring is likely to be the case.”

#### Multilateral efforts fail---can’t solve the system

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Naazneen Barma is an assistant professor of national-security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School. Ely Ratner is a fellow at the Center for a New American Security. Steven Weber is a professor of political science and at the School of Information at the University of California, Berkeley, The National Interest, March/April 2013, "The Mythical Liberal Order", http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-mythical-liberal-order-8146

Not only have we seen this movie before, but it seems to be on repeat. Instead of a gradual trend toward global problem solving punctuated by isolated failures, we have seen over the last several years essentially the opposite: stunningly few instances of international cooperation on significant issues. Global governance is in a serious drought—palpable across the full range of crucial, mounting international challenges that include nuclear proliferation, climate change, international development and the global financial crisis.

Where exactly is the liberal world order that so many Western observers talk about? Today we have an international political landscape that is neither orderly nor liberal.

It wasn’t supposed to be this way. In the envisaged liberal world order, the “rise of the rest” should have been a boost to global governance. A rebalancing of power and influence should have made international politics more democratic and multilateral action more legitimate, while bringing additional resources to bear. Economic integration and security-community enlargement should have started to envelop key players as the system built on itself through network effects—by making the benefits of joining the order (and the costs of opposing it) just a little bit greater for each new decision. Instead, the world has no meaningful deal on climate change; no progress on a decade-old global-trade round and no inclination toward a new one; no coherent response to major security issues around North Korea, Iran and the South China Sea; and no significant coordinated effort to capitalize on what is possibly the best opportunity in a generation for liberal progress—the Arab Spring.

It’s not particularly controversial to observe that global governance has gone missing. What matters is why. The standard view is that we’re seeing an international liberal order under siege, with emerging and established powers caught in a contest for the future of the global system that is blocking progress on global governance. That mental map identifies the central challenge of American foreign policy in the twenty-first century as figuring out how the United States and its allies can best integrate rising powers like China into the prevailing order while bolstering and reinforcing its foundations.

But this narrative and mental map are wrong. The liberal order can’t be under siege in any meaningful way (or prepped to integrate rising powers) because it never attained the breadth or depth required to elicit that kind of agenda. The liberal order is today still largely an aspiration, not a description of how states actually behave or how global governance actually works. The rise of a configuration of states that six years ago we called a “World Without the West” is not so much challenging a prevailing order as it is exposing the inherent frailty of the existing framework.

This might sound like bad news for American foreign policy and even worse news for the pursuit of global liberalism, but it doesn’t have to be so. Advancing a normative liberal agenda in the twenty-first century is possible but will require a new approach. Once strategists acknowledge that the liberal order is more or less a myth, they can let go of the anxious notion that some countries are attacking or challenging it, and the United States can be liberated from the burden of a supposed obligation to defend it. We can instead focus on the necessary task of building a liberal order from the ground up.

Loyalists are quick to defend the concept of a robust liberal order by falling back on outdated metrics of success. The original de minimis aims of the postwar order achieved what now should be considered a low bar: preventing a third world war and a race-to-the-bottom closure of the global-trade regime. Beyond that, the last seventy years have certainly seen movement toward globalization of trade and capital as well as some progress on human rights—but less clearly as a consequence of anything like a liberal world order than as a consequence of national power and interest.

What would a meaningful liberal world order actually look like if it were operating in practice? Consider an objective-based definition: a world in which most countries most of the time follow rules that contribute to progressively more collective security, shared economic gains and individual human rights. States would gradually downplay the virtues of relative advantage and self-reliance. Most states would recognize that foreign-policy choices are constrained (to their aggregate benefit) by multilateral institutions, global norms and nonstate actors. They would cede meaningful bits of sovereign authority in exchange for proactive collaboration on universal challenges. And they would accept that economic growth is best pursued through integration, not mercantilism, and is in turn the most reliable source of national capacity, advancement and influence. With those ingredients in place, we would expect to see the gradual, steady evolution of something resembling an “international community” bound by rights and responsibilities to protect core liberal values of individual rights and freedoms.

No wonder proponents of the liberal-world-order perspective hesitate to offer precise definitions of it. Few of these components can reasonably be said to have been present for any length of time at a global level in the post–World War II world. There may be islands of liberal order, but they are floating in a sea of something quite different. Moreover, the vectors today are mostly pointing away from the direction of a liberal world order.

HOW DID we get here? Consider two founding myths of liberal internationalism. The first is that expressions of post–World War II American power and leadership were synonymous with the maturation of a liberal order. The narrative should sound familiar: The United States wins World War II and controls half of global GDP. The United States constructs an international architecture aimed at promoting an open economic system and a semi-institutionalized approach to fostering cooperation on security and political affairs. And the United States provides the essential global public goods—an extended security deterrent and the global reserve currency—to make cooperation work. Some essential elements of the system survive in a posthegemony era because the advantages to other significant powers of sustained institutionalized cooperation exceed the costs and risks of trying to change the game.

In the 1990s the narrative gets more interesting, controversial and relevant. This is when the second foundational myth of the liberal world order—that it has an inexorable magnetic attraction—comes to the fore. The end of the Cold War and the attendant rejection of Communism is supposed to benefit the liberal world order in breadth and depth: on the internal front, new capitalist democracies should converge on individuals’ market-based economic choice and election-based political choice; on the external front, the relationships among states should become increasingly governed by a set of liberal international norms that privilege and protect the civic and political freedoms that capitalist democracies promise. The liberal order’s geography should then expand to encompass the non-Western world. Its multilateral rules, institutions and norms should increase in density across economic, political and security domains. As positive network effects kick in, the system should evolve to be much less dependent on American power. It’s supposedly easier—and more beneficial—to join the liberal world order than it is to oppose it (or even to try to modify it substantially). A choice to live outside the system becomes progressively less realistic: few countries can imagine taking on the contradictions of modern governance by themselves, particularly in the face of expanding multilateral free trade and interdependent security institutions.

The story culminates in a kind of magnetic liberalism, where countries and foreign-policy decisions are attracted to the liberal world order like iron filings to a magnet. With few exceptions, U.S. foreign policy over the last two decades has been predicated on the assumption that the magnetic field is strong and getting stronger. It’s a seductive idea, but it should not be confused with reality. In practice, the magnetic field is notable mainly for its weakness. It is simply not the case today that nations feel equally a part of, answerable to or constrained by a liberal order. And nearly a quarter century after 1989, it has become disingenuous to argue that the liberal world order is simply slow in getting off the ground—as if the next gust of democratic transitions or multilateral breakthroughs will offer the needed push to revive those triumphalist moments brought on by the end of World War II and the fall of the Berlin Wall. To the contrary, the aspirational liberal end state is receding into the horizon.

THE PICTURE half a century ago looked more promising, with the initial rounds of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the successful establishment of NATO setting expectations about what multilateral governance could achieve. But international institutions picked off the low-hanging fruit of global cooperation decades ago and have since stalled in their attempts to respond to pressing international challenges. The 1990s served up the best possible set of conditions to advance global liberalism, but subsequent moves toward political and economic liberalization that came with the end of the Cold War were either surprisingly shallow or fragile and short-lived.

Ask yourself this: Have developing countries felt and manifested over time the increasing magnetic pull of the liberal world order? A number of vulnerable developing and post-Communist transitional countries adopted a “Washington Consensus” package of liberal economic policies—freer trade, marketization and privatization of state assets—in the 1980s and 1990s. But these adjustments mostly arrived under the shadow of coercive power. They generally placed the burden of adjustment disproportionately on the most disempowered members of society. And, with few exceptions, they left developing countries more, not less, vulnerable to global economic volatility. The structural-adjustment policies imposed in the midst of the Latin American debt crisis and the region’s subsequent “lost decade” of the 1980s bear witness to each of these shortcomings, as do the failed voucher-privatization program and consequent asset stripping and oligarchic wealth concentration experienced by Russians in the 1990s.

If these were the gains that were supposed to emerge from a liberal world order, it’s no surprise that liberalism came to have a tarnished brand in much of the developing world. The perception that economic neoliberalism fails to deliver on its trickle-down growth pledge is strong and deep. In contrast, state capitalism and resource nationalism—vulnerable to a different set of contradictions, of course—have for the moment delivered tangible gains for many emerging powers and look like promising alternative development paths. Episodic signs of pushback against some of the excesses of that model, such as anti-Chinese protests in Angola or Zambia, should not be confused with a yearning for a return to liberal prescriptions. And comparative economic performance in the wake of the global financial crisis has done nothing to burnish liberalism’s economic image, certainly not in the minds of those who saw the U.S. investment banking–led model of capital allocation as attractive, and not in the minds of those who held a vision of EU-style, social-welfare capitalism as the next evolutionary stage of liberalism.

There’s just as little evidence of sustained liberal magnetism operating in the politics of the developing world, where entrenched autocrats guarding their legitimacy frequently caricature democracy promotion as a not-very-surreptitious strategy to replace existing regimes with either self-serving instability or more servile allies of the West. In practice, the liberal order’s formula for democratic freedom has been mostly diluted down to observing electoral procedures. The results have been almost uniformly disappointing, as the legacy of post–Cold War international interventions from Cambodia to Iraq attests. Even the more organic “color revolutions” of Eastern Europe and Central Asia at the beginning of the twenty-first century have stalled into equilibria Freedom House identifies as only “partly free”—in reality affording average citizens little access to political or economic opportunities. Only two years past the initial euphoria of the Arab Spring a similar disillusionment has set in across the Middle East, where evidence for the magnetic pull of a liberal world order is extremely hard to find.

Contemporary developments in Southeast Asia illustrate where the most important magnetic forces of change actually come from. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has successfully coordinated moves toward trade liberalization in the region, but this has not been underpinned by a set of liberal principles or collective norms. Instead, the goals have been instrumental—to protect the region from international economic volatility and to cement together some counterweight to the Chinese economy. And ASEAN is explicitly not a force for individual political and economic freedom. Indeed, it acts more like a bulwark against “interference” in internal affairs. The aspirations one occasionally hears for the organization to implement collective-governance measures come from Western observers much more frequently than from the people and states that comprise the group itself.

Global governistas will protest that the response to the global financial crisis proves that international economic cooperation is more robust than we acknowledge. In this view, multilateral financial institutions passed the stress test and prevented the world from descending into the economic chaos of beggar-thy-neighbor trade policies and retaliatory currency arbitrage and capital controls. The swift recovery of global trade and capital flows is often cited as proof of the relative success of economic cooperation. The problem with this thesis is that very real fears about how the system could collapse, including the worry that states would retreat behind a mercantilist shell, are no different from what they were a hundred years ago. It’s not especially indicative of liberal progress to be having the same conversation about global economic governance that the world was having at the end of the gold-standard era and the onset of the Great Depression. Global economic governance may have helped to prevent a repeat downward spiral into self-defeating behaviors, but surely in a world order focused on liberal progress the objectives of global economic governance should have moved on by now. And the final chapter here has yet to be written. From the perspective of many outside the United States, the Federal Reserve’s unprecedented “quantitative easing” policies are not far off from monetary warfare on the exchange and inflation rates of others. Astute analysts have observed that as banks have operated more nationalistically and cautiously, the free flow of capital across borders has declined. A global climate that is at serious risk of breeding currency and trade wars is hardly conducive to the health and expansion of any liberal world order.

On matters of war and peace, the international community is fighting similar battles and for the most part experiencing similar failures to provide a system of collective security. In Africa’s Great Lakes region, more than five million people have died directly and indirectly from fifteen years of civil war and conflict. Just to the north, the international community stood by and watched a genocide in Sudan. In places more strategically important to leading nations, the outcome—as showcased in Syria—is geopolitical gridlock.

The last time the Security Council managed to agree on what seemed like serious collective action was over Libya, but both China and Russia now believe they were intentionally misled and that what was sold as a limited humanitarian mission was really a regime-change operation illegitimately authorized by the UN. This burst of multilateralism has actually made global-security governance down the road less likely. Meanwhile, international cooperation on security matters has been relegated to things like second-tier peacekeeping operations and efforts to ward off pirates equipped with machine guns and speedboats. These are worthy causes but will not move the needle on the issues that dominate the international-security agenda. And on the emerging issues most in need of forward-looking global governance—cybersecurity and unmanned aerial vehicles, for example—there are no rules and institutions in place at all, nor legitimate and credible mechanisms to devise them.

Assessed against its ability to solve global problems, the current system is falling progressively further behind on the most important challenges, including financial stability, the “responsibility to protect,” and coordinated action on climate change, nuclear proliferation, cyberwarfare and maritime security. The authority, legitimacy and capacity of multilateral institutions dissolve when the going gets tough—when member countries have meaningfully different interests (as in currency manipulations), when the distribution of costs is large enough to matter (as in humanitarian crises in sub-Saharan Africa) or when the shadow of future uncertainties looms large (as in carbon reduction). Like a sports team that perfects exquisite plays during practice but fails to execute against an actual opponent, global-governance institutions have sputtered precisely when their supposed skills and multilateral capital are needed most.

WHY HAS this happened? The hopeful liberal notion that these failures of global governance are merely reflections of organizational dysfunction that can be fixed by reforming or “reengineering” the institutions themselves, as if this were a job for management consultants fiddling with organization charts, is a costly distraction from the real challenge. A decade-long effort to revive the dead-on-arrival Doha Development Round in international trade is the sharpest example of the cost of such a tinkering-around-the-edges approach and its ultimate futility. Equally distracting and wrong is the notion held by neoconservatives and others that global governance is inherently a bad idea and that its institutions are ineffective and undesirable simply by virtue of being supranational.

The root cause of stalled global governance is simpler and more straightforward. “Multipolarization” has come faster and more forcefully than expected. Relatively authoritarian and postcolonial emerging powers have become leading voices that undermine anything approaching international consensus and, with that, multilateral institutions. It’s not just the reasonable demand for more seats at the table. That might have caused something of a decline in effectiveness but also an increase in legitimacy that on balance could have rendered it a net positive.

Instead, global governance has gotten the worst of both worlds: a decline in both effectiveness and legitimacy. The problem is not one of a few rogue states acting badly in an otherwise coherent system. There has been no real breakdown per se. There just wasn’t all that much liberal world order to break down in the first place. The new voices are more than just numerous and powerful. They are truly distinct from the voices of an old era, and they approach the global system in a meaningfully different way.

#### Legitimacy and multilateralism are inevitable

Lamii Kromah 9, Dept. of IR, U Witwatersrand, The Institutional Nature of U.S. Hegemony: Post 9/11, http://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10539/7301/MARR%2009.pdf

Since the end of World War Two (WWII) the United States (U.S.) has been enabled to maintain its leadership through its allies. U.S. leadership and hegemony is based on mutual consent by its allies: Japan, Germany and Western Europe. By institutional nature of U.S. hegemony the author is referring to how the U.S. leads by consensus among its allies and through international organizations and institutions. Despite the United States having overwhelming power capabilities in every sphereeconomic, military, and cultural -it does not act unilaterally; a close survey of its history will show that multilateralism has been and will continue to be the main facet of itsforeign policy. The period under examination is after World War Two to the end of George Walker Bush second term. The legitimacy derived from U.S. hegemony allows the U.S. to remain a super power in what could potentially be a multi polar world. The liberal regime the United States help established at the end of World War Two is what ensures and secures its primacy. Institutions like the World Bank and United Nations are regimes that are conducive for the allies to forgo harmful competition and foster cooperation. The U.S. building institutions that provide its allies with security and as plateaus to foster cooperation is what this research report examines. With Iraq being the first post 9/11 test of this theory; it should be kept in mind that the hegemon will occasionally act unilaterally but only in rare instances. Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia is a recent example. The case of Iraq further illustrates my point because after being in Iraq for five years, the Bush administration has seen the futility in unilateralism. Research Problem In this research report I will prove that U.S. leadership is based on consent. Despite 9/11 terrorist attack the United States (U.S.), U.S. foreign policy will still be rooted in multilaterism. The benevolent regimes it created after WWII, such as the United Nations, World Bank Institutions, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, gives the incentive for nation states to cooperate. Since the end of World War Two the United States has been enabled to maintain its leadership by its allies. U.S. leadership and hegemony is based on mutual consent by its allies. The legitimacy derived from this allows the U.S. to remain a super power in what could potentially be a multi polar world. Multilateralism has always been the major tenet in United States foreign policy. The unilateral actions taken by President George W. Bush are transitory and not the norm after 9/11, such as pulling out of the Kyoto Agreement, and invasion of Iraq. In the last two years, 20062009, the administration back-tracked from its former unilateral stance and Bush Doctrine. It regularly consulted allies, international organizations, and various non governmental organizations. This is bound to continue under the new Barack Obama administration that has swiftly committed itself to multilateralism also; the first instance of this is returning the permanent representative at the United Nations to the rank of cabinet position. The foreign policy team of Obama are all committed multilateralists that believe in resolving global conflict through consensus with its allies and not against its allies. The period this research report focuses on is after World War II to George Walker Bush presidency. U.S. hegemonic order is quite unlike the earlier British hegemonic order that was immensely unstable. Since the end of WWII the U.S. has built up a network of complex interdependence that will mutually reinforce U.S. hegemonic leadership. This includes building and promoting democratic institutions in countries like Japan, and Germany. The U.S. established the Bretton Woods Agreement to ensure free trade and open markets, international organizations, like the United Nations (UN) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), were seen as the best way of ensuring liberal institutionalism. This research report seeks to argue that U.S. leadership provided the stability and peace among the western powers WWII. To be sure, its overall material capabilities and power position have declined significantly since the early postwar years. Notwithstanding this, the proposed study seeks to provide evidence that the political institutions and structures of relations that were built under U.S. sponsorship after World War II still provide channels and routines of cooperation. America will not (and probably cannot) play the leadership role it did a generation ago, but that leadership has been reinvented in the form of a dense set of intergovernmental and transnational linkages among the major industrial countries and regions of the world. 1 These linkages will ensure the continuance of American leadership because it benefits the international system. It will also be used to prevent global conflict and ensure peace and prosperity despite the events of President George W. Bush’s foreign policy, U.S. hegemony will continue to operate on Wilisonian liberalism. 9/11 will not change the course of U.S. foreign policy which is based on multilateralism. This research report will focus on the Post 9/11 failure of unilateralism and continuance of multilateralism. I will test this hypothesis by examining the pre 9/11 structure of the U.S.-led collective security system, and also Japan, Germany’s role in supporting and aiding U.S. hegemony in the financial and conflict resolution institutional framework.

## Stability

#### Drug violence is declining

Bargent 2-7-13 (James, Independent journalism from Colombia and Latin America, “Mexico Drug War Violence Slowing: Report”, Febraury 7th, 2013, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/mexico-drug-war-violence-slowing-report)

A new report analyzing the data behind Mexico’s drug war shows in 2012 organized crime related killings declined or leveled off while becoming increasingly concentrated in key strategic areas. The report, compiled by the San Diego University’s Trans-Border Institute, analyzed a range of data sources -- both official and independent -- to build a comprehensive picture of the shifting violence patterns in Mexico. The most significant trend identified was the slowing rate of drug war killings. While the conclusions of different data sets varied widely, they agreed that in 2012 the substantial year on year increases Mexico has seen since 2007 came to an end. According to data collated by Mexican newspaper Reforma, organized crime related murders dropped by over 21 percent, falling to 8,989 from 12,284. Projections for the government’s as yet unreleased figures show a 28% drop. However, figures from another media source, Milenio, showed an increase in its crime related murder tallies but by less than 1 percent – far lower than in previous years. The report also highlights how Mexico’s drug war violence is increasingly concentrated. Between 2007 and 2011, the number of municipalities that recorded no murders dropped by 28 percent, while the number of municipalities with 25 or more annual homicides grew from 50 to 240. However, in 2012, (for which, the report points out, the data set is incomplete) the number of municipalities free from violence increased 16% while the number with more than 25 homicides decreased more than 25% to 178. Over half the organized crime linked murders nationwide came from just five states; Sinaloa, Chihuaha, Nuevo Leon, Guerrero and Coahuila (although the order depends of the data set). 2012 also saw Acapulco assume the mantle of Mexico’s most violent city, even though the murder rate leveled off, while the cities of Monterrey, Torreon, and Nuevo Laredo posted the largest increases in crime related killings. InSight Crime While the authorities will probably lay claim to the slowdown in drug violence, it is likely a more influential factor has been changing dynamics in the Mexican underworld, as reflected by the shifting geographical patterns.

#### No capability or impact to bioterror attack

Keller 3/7

(Rebecca, “Bioterrorism and the Pandemic Potential” March 7, 2013, Stratfor)

The risk of an accidental release of H5N1 is similar to that of other infectious pathogens currently being studied. Proper safety standards are key, of course, and experts in the field have had a year to determine the best way to proceed, balancing safety and research benefits. Previous work with the virus was conducted at biosafety level three out of four, which requires researchers wearing respirators and disposable gowns to work in pairs in a negative pressure environment. While many of these labs are part of universities, access is controlled either through keyed entry or even palm scanners. There are roughly 40 labs that submitted to the voluntary ban. Those wishing to resume work after the ban was lifted must comply with guidelines requiring strict national oversight and close communication and collaboration with national authorities. The risk of release either through accident or theft cannot be completely eliminated, but given the established parameters the risk is minimal. The use of the pathogen as a biological weapon requires an assessment of whether a non-state actor would have the capabilities to isolate the virulent strain, then weaponize and distribute it. Stratfor has long held the position that while terrorist organizations may have rudimentary capabilities regarding biological weapons, the likelihood of a successful attack is very low. Given that the laboratory version of H5N1 -- or any influenza virus, for that matter -- is a contagious pathogen, there would be two possible modes that a non-state actor would have to instigate an attack. The virus could be refined and then aerosolized and released into a populated area, or an individual could be infected with the virus and sent to freely circulate within a population. There are severe constraints that make success using either of these methods unlikely. The technology needed to refine and aerosolize a pathogen for a biological attack is beyond the capability of most non-state actors. Even if they were able to develop a weapon, other factors such as wind patterns and humidity can render an attack ineffective. Using a human carrier is a less expensive method, but it requires that the biological agent be a contagion. Additionally, in order to infect the large number of people necessary to start an outbreak, the infected carrier must be mobile while contagious, something that is doubtful with a serious disease like small pox. The carrier also cannot be visibly ill because that would limit the necessary human contact.

#### No risk of bioterror

Stratfor 7, private intelligence agency, analyzes geopolitical trends, 12/21/ (“Bioterrorism: Sudden Death Overtime?,” http://www2.stratfor.com/analysis/bioterrorism\_sudden\_death\_overtime)

In this season of large college bowl games and the National Football League playoffs in the United States, and large nonsporting events such as the New Year’s Eve celebration in New York’s Times Square — not to mention the upcoming Olympic Games in Beijing — a discussion of bioterrorism and the threat it poses might be of interest. First, it must be recognized that during the past several decades of the modern terrorist era, biological weapons have been used very infrequently — and there are some very good reasons for this. Contrary to their portrayal in movies and television shows, biological agents are difficult to manufacture and deploy effectively in the real world. In spite of the fear such substances engender, even in cases in which they have been somewhat effective they have proven to be less effective and more costly than more conventional attacks using firearms and explosives. In fact, nobody even noticed what was perhaps the largest malevolent deployment of biological agents in history, in which thousands of gallons of liquid anthrax and botulinum toxin were released during several attacks in a major metropolitan area over a three-year period. This use of biological agents was perpetrated by the Japanese apocalyptic cult Aum Shinrikyo. An examination of the group’s chemical and biological weapons (CBW) program provides some important insight into biological weapons, their costs — and their limitations. In the late 1980s, Aum’s team of trained scientists spent millions of dollars to develop a series of state-of-the-art biological weapons research and production laboratories. The group experimented with botulinum toxin, anthrax, cholera and Q fever and even tried to acquire the Ebola virus. The group hoped to produce enough biological agent to trigger a global Armageddon. Between April of 1990 and August of 1993, Aum conducted seven large-scale attacks involving the use of thousands of gallons of biological agents — four with anthrax and three with botulinum toxin. The group’s first attempts at unleashing mega-death on the world involved the use of botulinum toxin. In April of 1990, Aum used a fleet of three trucks equipped with aerosol sprayers to release liquid botulinum toxin on targets that included the Imperial Palace, the Diet and the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, two U.S. naval bases and the airport in Narita. In spite of the massive quantities of agent released, there were no mass casualties and, in fact, nobody outside of the cult was even aware the attacks had taken place. When the botulinum operations failed to produce results, Aum’s scientists went back to the drawing board and retooled their biological weapons facilities to produce anthrax. By mid-1993, they were ready to launch attacks involving anthrax, and between June and August of 1993 the group sprayed thousands of gallons of aerosolized liquid anthrax in Tokyo. This time Aum not only employed its fleet of sprayer trucks, but also use sprayers mounted on the roof of their headquarters to disperse a cloud of aerosolized anthrax over the city. Again, the attacks produced no results and were not even noticed. It was only after the group’s successful 1995 subway attacks using sarin nerve agent that a Japanese government investigation discovered that the 1990 and 1993 biological attacks had occurred. Aum Shinrikyo’s team of highly trained scientists worked under ideal conditions in a first-world country with a virtually unlimited budget. The team worked in large, modern facilities to produce substantial quantities of biological weapons. Despite the millions of dollars the group spent on its bioweapons program, it still faced problems in creating virulent biological agents, and it also found it difficult to dispense those agents effectively. Even when the group switched to employing a nerve agent, it only succeeded in killing a handful of people. A comparison between the Aum Shinrikyo Tokyo subway attack and the jihadist attack against the Madrid trains in 2004 shows that chemical/biological attacks are more expensive to produce and yield fewer results than attacks using conventional explosives. In the March 1995 Tokyo subway attack — Aum’s most successful — the group placed 11 sarin-filled plastic bags on five different subway trains and killed 12 people. In the 2004 Madrid attack, jihadists detonated 10 improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and killed 191 people. Aum’s CBW program cost millions and took years of research and effort; the Madrid bombings only cost a few thousand dollars, and the IEDs were assembled in a few days. The most deadly biological terrorism attack to date was the case involving a series of letters containing anthrax in the weeks following the Sept. 11 attacks — a case the FBI calls Amerithrax. While the Amerithrax letters did cause panic and result in companies all across the country temporarily shutting down if a panicked employee spotted a bit of drywall dust or powdered sugar from doughnuts eaten by someone on the last shift, in practical terms, the attacks were very ineffective. The Amerithrax letters resulted in five deaths; another 22 victims were infected but recovered after receiving medical treatment. The letters did not succeed in infecting senior officials at the media companies targeted by the first wave of letters, or Sens. Tom Daschle and Patrick Leahy, who were targeted by a second wave of letters. By way of comparison, John Mohammed, the so-called “D.C. Sniper,” was able to cause mass panic and kill twice as many people (10) by simply purchasing and using one assault rifle. This required far less time, effort and expense than producing the anthrax spores used in the Amerithrax case. It is this cost-benefit ratio that, from a militant’s perspective, makes firearms and explosives more attractive weapons for an attack. This then is the primary reason that more attacks using biological weapons have not been executed: The cost is higher than the benefit. Certainly, history has shown that militant organizations and homegrown militants are interested in large sporting events as venues for terror; one needs to look no further than the 1972 Munich Massacre, the 1980 Olympic Park bombing or even the 2005 incident in which University of Oklahoma student Joel Hinrichs died after a TATP-filled backpack he was wearing exploded outside a football game at Oklahoma Memorial Stadium, to see this. Because of this, vigilance is needed. However, militants planning such attacks will be far more likely to use firearms or IEDs in their attacks than they will biological agents. Unfortunately, in the real world guns and suicide bombs are far more common — and more deadly — than air horns filled with creepy bioterror.

#### No impact to oil shocks

Kahn 11 (Jeremy, Jeremy Kahn is an independent journalist who writes about international affairs, politics, business, the environment and the arts. His work has recently appeared in Newsweek International, The New York Times, The Atlantic, Smithsonian, The Boston Globe, The New Republic, Slate, Foreign Policy, Fortune, and Inc., as well as other publications. He has also contributed to the public radio program "Marketplace." Kahn was the managing editor at The New Republic from 2004 to 2006. There he had a hand in most of the magazine's politics and world affairs coverage. He also oversaw the magazine's "Notebook" section. Kahn was twice named one of America's 30 top financial journalists under the age of 30 by the trade publication TJFR. 2/13, “Crude reality”, <http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2011/02/13/crude_reality/>)

The idea that a sudden spike in oil prices spells economic doom has influenced America’s foreign policy since at least 1973, when Arab states, upset with Western support for Israel during the Yom Kippur War, drastically cut production and halted exports to the United States. The result was a sudden quadrupling in crude prices and a deep global recession. Many Americans still have vivid memories of gas lines stretching for blocks, and of the unemployment, inflation, and general sense of insecurity and panic that followed. Even harder hit were our allies in Europe and Japan, as well as many developing nations. Economists have a term for this disruption: an oil shock. The idea that such oil shocks will inevitably wreak havoc on the US economy has become deeply rooted in the American psyche, and in turn the United States has made ensuring the smooth flow of crude from the Middle East a central tenet of its foreign policy. Oil security is one of the primary reasons America has a long-term military presence in the region. Even aside from the Iraq and Afghan wars, we have equipment and forces positioned in Oman, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar; the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet is permanently stationed in Bahrain. But a growing body of economic research suggests that this conventional view of oil shocks is wrong. The US economy is far less susceptible to interruptions in the oil supply than previously assumed, according to these studies. Scholars examining the recent history of oil disruptions have found the worldwide oil market to be remarkably adaptable and surprisingly quick at compensating for shortfalls. Economists have found that much of the damage once attributed to oil shocks can more persuasively be laid at the feet of bad government policies. The US economy, meanwhile, has become less dependent on Persian Gulf oil and less sensitive to changes in crude prices overall than it was in 1973.

#### Best data

**Rasmussen**, senior economist at the IMF, **and Roitman**, economist at the IMF, **2/22**/2012

[Tobias and Agustin, “Oil Shocks Around the World: Are They Really That Bad?,” <http://www.theoildrum.com/node/8944>]

**The message is clear**. In more than 80% of the countries, the correlation between oil prices and GDP is positive, and in only two advanced economies – the US and Japan – it is negative. One of the contributing factors to this pattern is that in 90% of the countries, exports tend to move in the same direction as oil prices. Anatomy of oil shock episodes Given that periods of **high oil prices have generally coincided with good times for the world economy**, **especially in recent years**, it is important to disentangle the impact of oil price increases on economic activity during episodes of markedly high oil prices. Following Hamilton (2003), we identify 12 episodes since 1970 in which oil prices have reached three-year highs. The median increase in oil prices in these years was 27%. We study the behaviour of macroeconomic aggregates during these episodes by comparing the median annual change in a particular variable during oil shock years to the median annual change over the entire sample period. This tells us of any unusual observed changes (Figure 2). We find **no evidence of a widespread contemporaneous negative effect** on economic output across oil-importing countries, but rather value and volume increases in both imports and exports. It is only in the year after the shock that we find a negative impact on output for a small majority of countries. To analyse multiple countries and control for global conditions, we adapt the basic autoregressive model of Hamilton (2003, 2005). Our main interest is in the effect of an oil price shock on the economy of a typical oil-importing country. Taking into account the fact that higher oil prices are generally positively associated with good global conditions, we find that the effect becomes larger and more significant as the ratio of oil imports to GDP increases (Figure 3). To trace out the full impact of an oil shock, we calculate impulse responses for a 25% increase in oil prices (Figure 4). The results indicate that the typical oil importer can expect a **cumulative GDP loss of about 0.3%** **over the first two years**, **with little subsequent impact**. For countries with oil imports of more than 4% of GDP (ie at or above the average for middle- and low-income oil importers), however, the loss increases to about 0.8% – and this loss increases further for those with oil imports above 5% of GDP. In contrast to the oil importers, oil exporters show little impact on GDP in the first two years but then a substantial increase consistent with the positive income effect, with real GDP 0.6% higher three years after the initial shock. Figure 3. To put these numbers in perspective, it is useful to think of an economy where oil accounts for 4% of total expenditure and where aggregate spending is determined entirely by demand. If the quantity of oil consumption remains unchanged, then a 25% increase in the price of oil will cause spending on other items to decrease and, hence, real GDP to contract by 1% of the total. From this reference point, one would expect the possibility of substituting away from oil to reduce the overall impact on GDP. At the same time, there could also be factors working in the opposite direction, via, for example, confidence effects, market frictions, or changes in monetary policy. With our estimates of the GDP loss at only about half the level implied by the direct price effect on the import bill, **the results presented here suggest** the size of **any** such **magnifying effect**s, **if present**, **is not substantial across countries**.